A lot of media attention was given to the Signalgate incident where it was revealed that top Administration officials were using an unofficial and possibly insecure chat service to discuss ongoing operations. So far, the only casualty has been the meeting organizer, Mike Waltz, and he has only been shuffled off to the walking wounded job of UN ambassador.
Larger issues of national security vulnerability have gone under the radar. A recent nytimes article gives some hints at what might be usefully considered:
"... The C.I.A. plans to cut more than 1,000 staff positions through attrition over the next few years as the Trump administration shrinks the federal government..."
"... A spokeswoman for the agency did not directly confirm the plan to reduce its size but said in a statement that John Ratcliffe, the C.I.A. director, was 'moving swiftly; to ensure that its work force was responsive to the administration’s national security priorities.'..."
Perhaps we should be reassured that the administration has taken time to set some priorities, though the possibility that those priorities might actually pertain to security seems a little remote.
Cutting a thousand jobs from something as complicated as the intelligence establishment presents some obvious threats to performance and efficiency. However, of even more concern is the immediate outcome of the staff cuts, which is that there will be a multitude of former analysts and operatives out looking for jobs.
It is a good bet that those job-hunters' resumes - complete with pictures - are even now flooding the internet and sparking the interest of corporate recruiters. You can also be sure that those hungry, often disgruntled former agency staffers will come under scrutiny by the foreign intelligence agencies of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. All of whom, of course, have massive capabilities for online surveillance, and plenty of expertise in the cultivation of double agents.
As irritated as those job hunters might be at the course of events, the vast majority are patriots, and have no doubt received special training to alert them to possible threats. Still, it is not inconceivable that one out of that thousand might be tempted by an opportunity for retribution and enrichment. And, after all, that has happened before.
It might be argued that the people let go have been severed from ongoing operations, but of course they took a lot of knowledge with them, and many friendships will continue with active agency staff.
So, recognizing the potential for damage, what might be done? Having dealt itself a crippling blow, the agencies are ill prepared to keep an eye on where all the discards go. Probably the most effective and economical strategy would be just to hire them all back.